Peace, one and all…
I watched last night’s news of the recent profits of Shell and Centrica (the company which owns British Gas) with a growing sense of anger. Anger not so much at the thought of companies making a profit, but rather at the utter piracy of these huge multinationals – these announcements come at the same time that British Gas announce an imminent 35% rise in the price of gas! This smacks of injustice and outright robbery. Whilst more and more people are being driven into poverty, British Gas shareholders have been awarded a $165 million dividend! This adds insult to injury and is widely seen as an outright slap in the face of ordinary people (which, of course, it is).
But, although I am very angry, I do not want this to become a simple rant. The world’s current economic situation is a complex matter and it touches on all sorts of wider issues. I am not an economist, so my understanding is under-developed, but I do have a number of real concerns.
To illustrate my point, let me share a story from my own life with you. This morning, as I walked from the bus station to catch my train, I suddenly felt the urgent need to use the bathroom. Now, as anyone who has visited Merthyr Tydfil will know, the town centre is completely dominated by a huge Tesco Extra store. So, in I went to use the customer toilet. Unfortunately, on this occasion, the toilets were out of order for some reason, so I had to search for an alternative (at no small discomfort to myself, but more on that in a moment). The small out of order sign also carried the following legend: ’sorry for any inconvenience’, which immediately made me think of the lack of public conveniences in Merthyr (for overseas visitors, this is a polite UK expression for public toilet). What struck me was the stark realisation that the Tesco toilets were performing the function of a public service. Indeed, this is not the only example I can think of: the Tesco car park acts in much the same manner.
As I thought about this, I realised that in many areas of life large multinational corporations are playing an increasingly important role in the provision of public services. The key difference, of course, is that Tesco is not in directly accountable to the public in the same way that the local council is: we could not vote to change Tesco’s corporate strategy unless we were shareholders. I have no problem with companies seeking a profit, through fair and legitimate competition, but the questions I want to ask are these: how much of our public, civic space have we already surrendered to the demands of the ‘free market’? How can these companies be made more directly accountable? Or, more elementally, how are we to regain our hard-won democratic control, whilst still retaining economic growth? Are such things possible, or desirable?
Centrica’s profit announcement is a case in point. How can we really complain that it acts as a profit-making business when it is not tied in any way to state ownership? Most of our former nationalised industries have long been sold off (or ‘privatised’, to use the very revealing euphemism), so now that the ‘family silver’ is gone we should not be surprised at the appearance of mulit-national loan sharks. But, perhaps my understanding of economics is not sufficiently developed to understand all of the implications of re-nationalisation (though I am not sure I am actually advocating such a thing). But, I do think that we are losing many of our public, democratic rights in the face of corporate power – which is finding its way into ever more areas of life.
The UK Higher Education sector is a good example of this trend. Over the last 10 years or so, the UK HE sector has dramatically expanded. The government’s stated target is that 50% of those with A Levels should go on to university. This has forced us to face an important issue: how are we going to pay for this growth? How are we to expand HE whilst simultaneously maintaining educational standards? It has also led to an increasingly corporate identity in UK HE. Fees, student loans and other things have all begun to change the way HE is perceived, especially amongst newer students. I have noticed many students whose attitude seems to be ‘well, I’ve paid to come here, so why aren’t you giving me the grades I want’?
I do not have all (or any) of the answers to these questions. I do know, however, that we must face them. As a society (and a world) we have many pressing questions to answer.
My anger is also fuelled by another, more personal issue. Someone very close to me is in serious financial difficulty. Rising prices have affected us all and have compounded this person’s situation. Although I will say no more, as this is a private matter, I would like to ask those passing by to say a prayer on this person’s behalf. God hears all things and there is no veil between God and the prayer of an oppressed person.
These issues have all made me feel great anger, but what is the spiritual purpose behind such feelings? In other words, what should I do with this anger? How can I use it appropriately and in a spiritually energising manner? This is something I really struggle with. Again, disappointingly perhaps, I have no answers. Here are some of my initial thoughts.
Perhaps the spiritual purpose of anger is to challenge the oppression of others? The following statements of the Prophet (alaihi al-salatu wa al-salam) are very instructive in this regard.
‘Mus’ab ibn Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas said, “Sa’d thought that he had preference over those below him and the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, ‘Are you given victory and provision except on account of the weak among you?’”
(Recorded by Imam al-Bukhari, and Imam al-Nawawi, Riyadh al-Salihin no.271)
‘Abu’d-Darda’ ‘Umaymir said, “I heard the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, say, ‘Help me in seeking out the weak. They are supported. You are provided for on account of the weak among you.”
(Recorded by Imam Abu Dawud, and Imam al-Nawawi, Riyadh al-Salihin no.272)
On another occasion, the Messenger of God (alaihi al-salatu wa al-salam) is reported to have said:
Abu Huraira reported: I heard Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: One is not strong because of one’s wrestling skillfully. They said: Allah’s Messenger, then who is strong? He said: He who controls his anger when he is in a fit of rage’ (Sahih Muslim, Book 32, Number 6314)
Perhaps, then, anger is useful only when it is controlled and chanelled to some useful purpose. Perhaps this lies behind other statements which refer to becoming angry only for the sake of God.
At any rate, for myself, I experience intense anger physically as a tightness of body. This is why, wandering around Merthyr town centre in search of a lavatory, all of these various layers of anger seemed about to boil over. I felt an intense pain in my lower back, that left me almost bent double at the far end of the platform. My only recourse was to ask God for aid. As I was doing this, a sudden thought came to me all unbidden: ‘I will fight for my humanity. I will not allow my anger to change me into something less than human’. And then the train came and my difficulty was swiftly eased. Allah!
Perhaps, then, the purpose of anger is transformation. Anger can be both fuel and catalyst for great inward change it seems. Or, at least, the real potential for such change exists in each moment of anger (if I can but read the signs aright). With God’s help anger can become a means of challenging injustice with the energy of truth (or jihad in other words). But, to be truly transformative anger must be channelled and guided by mercy, as a famous hadith qudsi puts it:
Allah’s Apostle said, “When Allah completed the creation, He wrote in His Book which is with Him on His Throne, “My Mercy overpowers My Anger.” (Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 54, Number 416)
Allah! Help uis in these trying times. Let the anger we feel aid us in our transformation, and lend us Your mighty aid in all things.
Update: searching though the archives, I came across some related posts. So, here they are for your reading enjoyment (well, here they are anyway):
And I end with these sayings of the wise:
And my last prayer is in praise of God, Sustainer of All Being.
Ma’as salama,
Abdur Rahman
August 1, 2008 at 2:00 pm
” Don’t look at your form, however ugly or beautiful.
Look at love and at the aim of your quest. …
O you whose lips are parched, keep looking for water.
Those parched lips are proof that eventually you will reach the source.”
August 1, 2008 at 2:01 pm
Perhaps the tulip know the fickleness
Of Fortune’s smile, for on her stalk’s green shaft
She bears a wine cup through the wilderness
August 1, 2008 at 2:03 pm
this is sufi poetry by rumi and hafiz
August 1, 2008 at 2:07 pm
There is a new event for today. It is called Bridging the Gap- the Muslim Youth Helpline annual charity dinner.
August 1, 2008 at 2:07 pm
There is a new event for today. It is called Traditional Halaqa.
August 1, 2008 at 2:08 pm
There is a new event for today. It is called Islamic Banking & Finance 101.
August 1, 2008 at 2:40 pm
Punishment In Islamic Law: A Critique Of The Hudud Bill Of Kelantan, Malaysia
Mohammed Hashim Kamali
INTRODUCTION
Ever since its ratification in November1993 by the State Legislature of Kelantan, the Hudud-Bill has been the focus of public debate in Malaysia. The Bill has come under criticism both on specific points as well as generally as being eager to inflict punishment and pain. This approach, although a necessary ingredient of a penal policy, needs to be moderated by such other influences that are felt to be equally important in the formulation of a comprehensive philosophy of punishment. To show care and compassion and to provide an opportunity for those who might be ready to repent and reform are among the considerations that have received greater attention in the formulation of a comprehensive penal policy in modern times. Apart from the essential merit of the harmonious approach, the added emphasis on rehabilitation and reform is an acknowledgement on the part of society at large that crime is not a totally isolated phenomenon and that society has increasingly become an unwilling partner in the rising tide of criminality and aggression.
The Qur’anic outlook on punishment may be characterised by its dual emphasis on retribution and reformation. It is my submission that the conventional fiqhi approach to the formulation of the underlying policy toward the hudud has failed to be adequately reflective of the Qur’anic guidance on this subject. And then in its typically imitative and taqlidi orientation, I further submit, that the Hudud Bill of Kelantan has also failed to be reflective either of the balanced outlook of the Qur’an or of the social conditions and realities of contemporary Malaysian society.
This article is presented in five parts. The first part highlights the provisions of the Bill concerning the six hudud offences that will be the focus of our discussion throughout the article. Part two is basically a statement of the problems and it is concerned mainly with the specifics as to where and how could the Hudud Bill be amended and improved. Here I have examined the provisions of the Bill which are in conflict with the Federal Constitution and the Penal Code. Issues are also addressed in this part pertaining to the status of non Muslims the proof of zina, questions over rape, circumstantial evidence, and issues over apostasy, slanderous accusation, and the punishment of theft.
The next part presents a perspective concerning the understanding of hudud in the Qur’an and related developments in fiqh. An enquiry into Qur’anic evidence leads us to the conclusion that a certain rigidity which has characterised the juristic formulations of fiqh on this theme are neither Qur’anic nor authorised by the Sunnah. “Hudud Allah” in the Qur’an is a broad concept which is neither confined to punishments nor to a legal framework but provides a comprehensive set of guidelines on moral, legal, and religious themes. Juristic thought has, however, followed a different course whereby this broad and comprehensive concept is reduced to mean quantified, mandatory and invariable punishment. The four offences for which the Qur’an prescribed a punishment were on the other hand expanded, in the fiqh presentations of the hudud, to six, and according to an alternative version, to seven, offences – and this was undertaken in the face of clear evidence that advised a restrictive approach in punitive matters. Whereas the Qur’an has, in all the four instances where specified punishments occur, made provisions for repentance and reformation, juristic doctrine has either left this totally out or reduced it to a mechanical formality that can hardly be said to be reflective of the original teachings of the Qur’an.
Part four enquires into the evidence concerning the punishment of stoning (rajm) for zina and underlines the issues which have given rise to differences among the madhahib. The last part of the article surveys recent views and contributions of Muslim scholars on the implementation of hudud in contemporary Muslim societies. The discussion here also advances a perspective over the question as to which should come first: an Islamic government, the Shari’ah, or the hudud. To insist on the hudud as an isolated case without providing the necessary context and environment is not likely to engender the desired results and may even prove oppressive and unjust. My discussion in this part ends with a brief analysis of the Hadith, which is also a legal maxim, that hudud must be suspended in doubtful situations.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BILL
The Shari’ah Criminal Code (II) Bill 1993 .(henceforth referred to as the Bill) consists of 72 clauses and five supplementary schedules, divided into six parts, namely hudud offences, qisas (just retaliation), evidence, implementation of punishments, general provisions and (Sharia) court proceedings. The hudud offences in part one also appear under the six headings of theft, highway robbery, (hirabah), unlawful carnal intercourse (zina), qadhf, that is slanderous accusation of zina which cannot be proved by four reliable witnesses, wine drinking (shurb) and apostasy (irtidad).
On 25 November 1993 when the state legislature unanimously passed the Bill the Chief Minister of Kelantan made it clear that the Bill “could not be implemented until the Federal Government of Malaysia made changes to the Federal Constitution”. This was evidently an acknowledgement on the part of the State Government-that by passing the hudud Bill, the state legislature had exceeded its jurisdiction under the Federal Constitution. The State Government also announced that the Bill was prepared by a committee and reviewed and approved by the State Islamic Religious Council and the state Mufti after considering it from all aspects of the Islamic Syariah”. The Chief Minister went on record to add that by enacting the Bill, the State Government was “performing a duty required by Islam” and failure to act in this regard “would be a great sin”. As to the question whether the people had accepted the State Government’s plan to implement the hudud laws, the Deputy Chief Minister (Abdul Halim) made the remarkable announcement that “the question did not arise as Muslims in the State who rejected the laws would be considered murtad (apostate)”.
In its section on theft (sariqa) the Bill penalises the first offence of theft, when it fulfils all the prescribed conditions (15 such conditions provided under Clause Seven) – with amputation of the right hand from the wrist, and the second offence with amputation of the left foot (in the middle in such a way that the heel may still be usable for walking and standing). The third and subsequent offences of theft are punishable with imprisonment for such terms as in the opinion of the court are “likely to lead to repentance” (Clauses 6 and 52).
The punishment for highway robbery is death and crucifixion if the robbery is accompanied by killing; and it is death only if the victim is killed but no property is taken away. In the event where the robber only takes the property without killing or injuring his victim the punishment is amputation of the right hand and the left foot (Clause 9).
Zina is punishable upon conviction by stoning (with stones of medium size) to death for a married person (i.e., muhsan) and whipping of 100 lashes plus one year imprisonment for the unmarried. Four eye-witnesses will be required to prove the act of zina. Each witness must be an adult male Muslim of just character. Witnesses shall be deemed to be just until the contrary is proven. The Bill also states that pregnancy on the part of an unmarried woman or when she delivers a child shall be evidence of zina which would make her liable to the prescribed punishment (Clauses 1, 41 and 46).
Qadhf or slanderous accusation of zina which the accuser is unable to prove by four witnesses carries 80 lashes of the whip, and punishment for drinking liquor based on the oral testimony of two persons is whipping of not more than 80 lashes but not less than 40 (Clauses 13 and 22).
A Muslim (adult and sane) who is accused of apostasy is required to repent within three days and failure to-do so makes him or her liable. To the punishment of death as well as the forfeiture of his or her property. The offender will be free of the death sentence, even if it has been passed, if he or she repents; the property will be returned but the defendant would still be liable to imprisonment “not exceeding five years” (Clause 23).
The Bill provides for the establishment of a Special Shari’ah Trial Court consisting of-three judges, two of whom shall be ulema, and a Special Shari’a Court of Appeal, consisting of five judges, including three ulema. These courts are to be in addition to the Shari’a courts that normally operate in Kelantan. All sentences can be appealed against and sentences are enforceable, in the case of hadd offences, only when confirmed by the Special Appeal Court (Clause 49).
PROBLEMATICS OF THE HUDUD BILL
The Hudud Bill gives rise to three types of problems, one of which is manifested in lack of jurisdiction leading to conflict with the Federal Constitution. Then there are problems relating to the realities of Malaysian society and politics. In the context of a multi-religious society, this Bill raises questions as to whether the nation should be governed by two sets of laws, one for Muslims, the other for non Muslims! And then the fact that only one of the 13 states of Malaysia has charted a different plan for itself has presented the national government with difficult choices. The other problem here is manifested in the fact that the Bill fails to offer a meaningful alternative as it raises questions over the wisdom of a literalist approach to the understanding of hudud. The Bill exhibits no attempt to exercise ijtihad over new issues, such that would fulfil the ideals of justice and encourage the development of a judicious social policy.
Constitutional issues
The Federal State power conflict over criminal law assumed new prominence with the passage of this Bill partly because of its overlap with the Penal Code. Some offences under the Bill are also federal law offences, giving rise to the issue of double jeopardy where both laws would be simultaneously enforceable. A person in that situation can seek protection against double jeopardy under Article 7 (2) of the Federal Constitution. There are also a number of offences such as theft, robbery, killing, rape, causing bodily harm, and unnatural offences which have been dealt with by the Penal Code, and there are provisions in this Code which relate to such other offences as false accusation of zina, consuming liquor, and using words of contempt against religion.
In an attempt to overcome this problem the Bill has barred any proceedings or trial under the Penal Code of a person who has been tried for the same offence under this Bill (Clause 61). But then questions arise as to the acceptability of this formula and whether it can resolve the conflict which the Bill has given rise to in the first place. It is quite unprecedented for the laws of one jurisdiction to prohibit trial under the laws of another jurisdiction particularly when it is the former that is violating the limits of its jurisdiction under the Constitution.
The Bill also provided for a range of punishments that are far in excess of the limitations which Parliament has imposed on the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts. The Shari’a Courts (Criminal jurisdiction) Act 1965, as amended in 1984, restricted the jurisdiction of these courts only to Muslims who may be tried for offences punishable with imprisonment of up to three years or a fine of up to RM5,000 or with whipping not exceeding six strokes, or with any combination of these. The hudud punishments that the Bill has proposed exceeds these limits, and it is doubtful whether the Special Shari’a Courts that are envisaged in the Bill could lawfully exercise their functions unless the Federal Parliament suitably amends the provisions of the 1965 Act.
As for the possibility that the Bill might -be nullified if it were found to be in conflict with the Federal Constitution, The Deputy Chief Minister of Kelantan announced, days before the ratification of the Bill in the State Assembly, that “the Kelantan Government would have fulfilled its responsibilities in tabling and getting the State Legislative Assembly to pass the hudud laws. It will then be up to the Federal Muslim leaders to prove their stand on the Islamic Shari’a. He further pointed out that the State Government would not be able to enforce the proposed law unless certain provisions of the Federal Constitution were amended.
The most explicit response to date came from the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir himself who said on 9 September 1994 that “the Government would not sit back and allow Pas to commit cruel acts against the people in Kelantan, including chopping off the hands of criminals”. The Prime Minister added that the Pas version of the Hudud Law “punishes victims while actual criminals were often let off with minimum punishment. For instance, if two people, a Muslim and a non Muslim, committed a crime, the Muslim offender will be punished severely like having his hands chopped off while the non-Muslim offender will escape with a light sentence like a fine or a month’s imprisonment”. The Prime Minister said that the Government was convinced that “the law passed by the Kelantan State Assembly in November last year was against the teachings of Islam”, adding that the punishment meted out must, be fair. However, according to the Pas laws, criminals are let off and the victim is punished. This is “against the true teachings of Islam” and should therefore be rejected.
The Prime Minister said that Pas “was only interested in gaining political mileage” by using the issue in view of the coming general election, adding that Pas leaders were aware of this and would continue to harp on the issue. Dr Mahathir declared that “the government would take action against the Pas Government if it implemented the Pas-created Hudud laws”. The proposed law could not be enforced because it was not in line with the Federal Constitution. The Federal Government cannot allow the Pas Government to enforce the laws which are against the Islamic spirit of justice.
The Shari’a and Hudud Laws Committee of the Malaysian Bar Council announced in early October that the Hudud Bill was consistent with Islamic law, but that there was “inconsistency in certain provisions between hudud laws and the Federal Constitution which can be overcome by amending the Constitution”. Following this, the State Government of Kelantan renewed its call and urged the Federal Government to review its decision over rejecting the Hudud Bill.
The Law Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, stated in a seminar paper he presented in Kuala Lumpur on 14 October 1994 that the Federal Government may introduce a new law “to check inconsistencies” in the legislation of Shari`a law by State Governments. He commented that shari’a law should not be treated as a state matter” any more because this had given rise to disparities between the state and federal jurisdictions on the one hand and those of the various states on the other. The Federal Government would consult State Governments and Shari’`a experts, the Minister added, before introducing new legislation, which he referred to as the “Hukum Syarak Act”.
To enable the Shari’a Courts to deal with cases of hudud, qisas and diyat, it will be necessary to amend the 9th Schedule, List 2 of the Constitution and repeal the Shari’a Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act. Professor Ahmad Ibrahim who made this observation earlier in 1993 also wrote that another possibility would be for the Federal Government “to enact the hudud, qisas, diyat and ta’zir laws for the purpose of uniformity of laws between the states”. But the learned author added that it would not be easy to do this “considering the difficulties and problems arising from the Federal Constitution and the present laws in Malaysia”.
The Federal Government has obviously not taken up the suggestions made earlier by the Kelantan State Government and the Bar Council Committee. Instead of accommodating requests for constitutional amendment to give the State Government of Kelantan a greater say in Shari’ah matters, it seems that the Federal Government might well do just the opposite.
The position of non-Muslims
Notwithstanding the attempt in the Hudud Bill (Clause 56) to make the proposed law applicable to Muslims only, and the choice it has granted to non-Muslims to choose if they wish whether the law should apply to them or not, there are questions that have remained unanswered. One of these is concerned, as already indicated, with the issue of jurisdiction. To grant such a choice to non-Muslims tends to fall into conflict with the Federal Constitution which clearly restricts the state jurisdiction to making law only as to “offences by persons professing the religion of Islam”.
Similar questions tend to arise as to the state of the law when both Muslims and non-Muslims are involved in a case of, say adultery or theft. It would seem that the choice of law that is envisaged in Clause 56 would be discriminatory and illogical. The question was rightly posed in a newspaper article when it was asked: If the law is meant for Muslims only, what will happen in cases where the victim is of a different faith from that of the criminal’s? Or if the witnesses to the crime are non-Muslims? Or if the accomplices to the crime are followers of different faiths?
The Shari`a itself does not provide for such a choice as in most of the hudud crimes difference of religion does not affect the unified application of the law. The only exemption found in the Sharia is with regard to the consumption of liquor, which by itself is not an offence with respect to a non-Muslim. According to a Hanafi opinion, non-Muslims are also not liable to the hadd punishment of zina. And then, of course, apostasy cannot be committed by a non-Muslim. But the Bill is anomalous on the application of hudud. What if the other party to the offence, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, is a native of another state of Malaysia where the hudud punishments are not applied? The Bill clearly provided that it shall apply to every Muslim “in respect of any offence committed by him in the state of Kelantan” (Clause 56). The Kelantan Government had obviously no better alternative as it could only make law for the Muslims of Kelantan, but by the same token, one might say that this provision tends to indulge in a doubtful application of the hudud. Imagine a situation where a resident of Kelantan commits an offence of just theft just outside the borders of Kelantan, or chooses to go there for the very purpose of committing adultery, theft, and drinking liquor, etc. The Bill could then be manipulated as it remains open to abuse and there is little that the Government of Kelantan could possibly do to prevent that.
There is a provision in the Bill concerning abetment and conspiracy by two or more persons in which case, “every person who abets or assists or conspires or plots for the commission of such offence shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment as ta’zir punishment for a term not exceeding ten years” (Clause 57). This clause is evidently designed to cover the eventuality, as discussed above, of a non-Muslim being a party to the hudud, for the terms “abetment, assistance, conspiracy and plot” are broad enough to comprise every possible case in which a non-Muslifn might be involved in the perpetration of a hadd offence.
The non-Muslims of Malaysia have on many occasions expressed apprehension over the manner in which the Sharz`a might be interpreted in regards to them. In a Kuala Lumpur seminar held prior to the publication of the Hudud Bill, of which the present writer was a participant, a non-Muslim speaker stated that “Malaysian non-Muslims- fear the imposition of the Shari’a', adding that, “if less than enlightened and principled understanding of Islam are used to justify attitudes toward, or the treatment of, non-Muslims that fall far short of the Qur’anic ideals… how much worse – we are entitled to wonder – may things become once Shari’a law (or rather a certain limited version or understanding of it) is enforced in this country”. Non-Muslims have raised questions as to “who will enforce it (Shari’ah), in what spirit and with what breadth or otherwise of understanding of Islam’s founding Qur’anic imperatives?. In voicing their concerns, the non Muslim community leaders have on the whole spoken positively of the Qur’anic ideals of justice and equality, and “the impressive cultural openness, inclusiveness and cosmopolitanism of Islam”, but have warned against restrictive and legalistic approaches towards the implementation of these ideals.
It may be said, in conclusion, that notwithstanding the clear text in Clause 56 which confines the application of the Hudud Bill to the Muslim residents of the State of Kelantan, the next Clause (57) tends to cast doubt, on, and overshadow the, content of, that Clause. Since every person who abets, or assists or conspires or plots in the perpetration of a hadd offence stands guilty of that offence, much would seem to depend on the attitude of judges and law enforcement agencies of Kelantan to interpretation as to how effectively they might be prepared to confine the application of this Bill only to the Muslim residents of that State.
Issues over rape and the proof of zina
The Bill has come under criticism for its total silence over the problem of rape. While the Bill addressed the subject of zina it did not mention rape at all, presumably because rape has been dealt with in the Penal Code. However, the Bill did not say so and there was no attempt made to show how it proposed to distinguish zina from rape. Zina has, on the other hand, been given a broad definition consisting of “sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married to each other and such intercourse did not come within the meaning of wati syubhah” (Clause 10.1). This last term signifies intercourse in doubtful but unlikely circumstances where the man might have mistaken the woman for his wife or acted in the belief that there was a valid marriage (Clause 10). In the absence of a provision to separate rape from zina, the broad definition of zina in this Bill is likely to subsume rape, in which case the two offences will fall under the same rules. This is all the more likely in view of Clause 46 (2) where it is stated that, “in the case of zina, pregnancy or delivery of a baby by an unmarried woman shall constitute evidence on which to find her guilty of zina and therefore the hudud punishment shall be passed on her unless she can prove to the contrary”. This has the potential of equating rape with zina. To apply the rules of zina to rape would mean that the rape victim must bring four male witnesses of just character to prove the charge against her attacker and if she fails to produce the necessary proof, then she would herself be liable to the punishment of qadhf. “To shift the burden of proof to the woman in the case of pregnancy or delivery of a child”, as one commentator added, notwithstanding the fact that this clause has been the focus of public criticism and debate, “there appears to be a doggedness on the part of the State Government-to retain the Clause as it has been drafted”.
The Bill has also been criticised for its provision concerning the witnesses of zina where it is stated that, “each witness shall be an adult male Muslim who is akil baligh (adult and competent) and shall be a person who is just” (Clause 41). Women have thus been disqualified from being a witness not only in zina but in all the hudud offences. Confession, which is the only other method of admissible proof in hudud, binds not only the confessor and not any other party charged with the same offence – and it can, in any case, be retracted by the accused any time “even while he is undergoing the punishment” (Clause 44). The proof of zina by witnesses is undoubtedly exacting, there being hardly a realistic possibility of it under normal circumstances. Then confession by the accused person which is the more likely alternative, whether in adultery or in rape, is also retractable at any stage of the proceedings.
The dilemma of the rape victim was accentuated by yet another commentator who noted that it was common among rape survivors that they did not seek medical aid immediately out of fear and shame. And it was not uncommon that the rape survivor did not struggle for fear of her own safety or the safety of others who were threatened with her.
It was further stated that the Hudud Bill discriminated against women in respect of both zina and rape. We have already explained the plight of the rape victim. As for zina, a charge of zina against a man can be proved by four male eye witnesses or his own confession, there being no other way of proof other than this. But zina of a woman is provable by four male eye witnesses, or her confession, or (being unmarried) by pregnancy or delivery of a child. In the case of a married woman accused of zina by her husband the Bill allows her husband, through the procedure of al-li’an, to disown the child, in which case the marriage will be dissolved even if the wife exercises a counter-oath to rebut the accusation of zina (Clauses 14 and 15).
Circumstantial evidence
The Bill has also been criticised for its provision which declared that “circumstantial evidence, though relevant, shall not be a valid method of proving a hudud offence” (Clause 46). Material and scientific evidence, like semen stains, vaginal swabs, blood samples, scratch marks, genetic fingerprinting, etc. are therefore not admissible as methods of proof in zina. The Bill thus rejects circumstantial evidence as a method of proof in zina on the one hand and then admits pregnancy or birth of a child both being circumstantial evidences – as proof of zina on the other.
The ulama have differed as to the evidential value of pregnancy in the proof of zina. The majority of jurists have classified pregnancy as a circumstantial evidence (qarinah) indicating the occurrence of zina on the part of an unmarried woman or one who is married but where her husband is incapable of being a fertile partner, or when there is childbirth within the first six months of marriage. Pregnancy is not a decisive circumstantial evidence (qarinah qati’ah) in that it cannot on its own be the basis of adjudication, but it is a farina which can be rebutted and overruled by other evidence. The law thus leaves open the possibility of its rebuttal and the court may hear evidence to prove that pregnancy has occurred without zina, or that sexual intercourse has occurred under duress by mistake or even without the knowledge of the defendant. When this is proven the hadd of zina must be suspended, and there may well be no case for any punishment, hadd, or ta’zir. Should there be a possibility that the pregnancy has occurred without penetration, the hadd punishment must again be suspended. This may happen, for example, when semen is planted in a woman by artificial methods, either by her or by another person, or through sex without penetration. The case will be all the more credible if the woman is still found to be a virgin. The Imams Abu Hanifah, Shafii and Ibn Hanbal have held that when all of these possibilities are eliminated, the woman should be asked if she has any explanation and if she herself claimed that she was either mistaken or compelled the hadd will be suspended. There will be no hadd punishment even if she did not make such a claim so long as she has not made a full confession., for the hadd can only be enforced by two methods of proof, namely witness or confession.
The majority position of admitting pregnancy as a circumstantial evidence is based on the saying of the Companion (qawl al-sahabz), a statement in particular of the caliph ‘Umar bin al Khattab who is reported to have said that “rajm is obligatory on anyone who commits zina, man or woman, provided that they are muhsan and that it is proven by witnesses, pregnancy or confession”.
Imam Malik has, however considered pregnancy as a conclusive proof of zina above the category of circumstantial evidence or farina. The emergence of pregnancy is thus enough to invoke the hadd punishment without confession. Moreover, the defendant’s claim as to compulsion and mistake will not be enough to suspend the hadd unless it is confirmed by supportive evidence. The Maliki jurist al-Dusuqi thus wrote that pregnancy was a proof of zina in respect of an unmarried woman or one who was married but the husband was incapable of being a fertile partner in conjugal relations. Thus a woman who is married to a majbub, that is a man whose sexual organ is mutilated, or when a married woman gives birth before the expiry of six months from the date of her marriage, she is regarded, to all intents and purposes, as unmarried and her pregnancy will be taken as proof of zina against her. If she claims compulsion and rape, her claim is not to be admitted and she is liable to punishment unless her claim is supported by circumstantial evidence such as screaming and calling for help. Signs of violence, and bleeding, from loss of virginity or otherwise, is circumstantial evidence, and so is the fact of her alerting others calmly, that is without screaming, at the time of the incident. It is then added that, “the best method of defence is for her to prove her claim of compulsion by the testimony of witnesses.
The possibilities of accident, error and abuse are in many ways greater today than they were in pre-modern times. I will mention only some of the well-known advances in medicine, such as the availability of artificial insemination and test tube pregnancy, and of semen banks which keep alive and preserve semen for very long periods, and the possibility also that people are often prepared to spend large sums of money either to obtain what they might want or to falsify and fabricate. Although virginity cannot survive actual childbirth, it is possible, according to expert opinion, for sexual intercourse, and also pregnancy, to take place and the hymen to remain intact. Modern medicine has also made it possible to repair, through surgery, the hymen after perforation. The availability of modern medical facilities pertaining to pregnancy, pre-natal care and childbirth has meant that Women tend to spend more time in hospital beds and outside the home environment. They are often put under anaesthetics or pain relieving drugs, and so on. Under these circumstances the possibility is even greater for sexual intercourse to take place without a woman’s knowledge or even with her knowledge but in circumstances of impaired capacity. It would therefore seem rather presumptuous, and here we refer particularly to Maliki law, to regard pregnancy as a conclusive proof of zina.
Issues over apostasy (irtidad)
There are two issues over the position taken in the Hudud Bill on irtidad, firstly that the definition of irtidad is so vague and general as to be lacking in focus and unless it is given a context, it is likely to conflict with both the Qur’an and the provisions of the Constitution of Malaysia on the basic freedom of religion. The definition of apostasy under the Bill is also broad enough to lump together a variety of different concepts such as blasphemy, apostasy, disbelief (kufr), and heresy (bidah), all under the same definition. The second issue is over the total neglect in this Bill of a body of opinion among the ulema that has been known to exist ever since the early days of Islam: the view that apostasy is not a hudud but a ta’zir offence is founded on the fact that the death punishment for apostasy is not a Qur’anic mandate. Similarly, the Hadith that provided the sole authority for the death penalty is open to interpretation which needs to be provided, if it were to be enforced at all. The main Hadith on the issue is that “whoever changes his religion shall be killed”.
Would it then be right to say that a Jew who converts to Islam or a Hindu who becomes a Christian should be liable to the death penalty- According to the rules of interpretation that are expounded is usul al-fiqh, once a decisive ruling of the text has been interpreted in some respect the ruling remains open to further levels of interpretation.
The Bill defines irtidad as “any act done or any word uttered by a Muslim who is a mukallaf, being an act or word which according to Syariah law, affects or which is against the ‘aqidah (belief) in Islamic religion” (Clause 23 (1)).
The Bill goes on to specify that the act or word in question must be voluntary and that there must be no compulsion. It is further provided that the acts or words that affect the ‘aqidah must be such that concern “the fundamental aspects of Islamic religion which are deemed to have been known and believed by every Muslim … pertaining to the Rukun Islam, Rukun Iman, and matters of halal (the allowable or the lawful) or haram (the prohibited or the unlawful)” (Clause 23). These expressions are all too imprecise and broad to form the basis of definition. There is also nothing in these provisions to draw a distinction between apostasy and blasphemy. The sum total of this approach would be that there will be no difference, for the purpose of enforcing the death penalty under this Bill, between a simple conversion which is neither contemptuous nor hostile and one which inflames the masses of Muslims and is capable of causing bloodshed and uncontrollable civil strife.
As for the Hadith just quoted, it may be specified and the death punishment therein may be reserved for apostasy which is accompanied by active hostility to the community and its leadership of a kind that amounts to high treason I (hi’rabah). There is, in fact, authority for this interpretation in another Hadith in which it is clearly stated that the life of a Muslim may be taken in three cases: murder, zina by a married person, and “one who renounces his religion while splitting himself off from the community (mufariq lil-jama’ah)”.
A number of prominent ulema across the centuries have taken the view that apostasy is not a hadd offence. Ibrahim al-Nakhai (d. 95 H) and Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 162 H) have held that the apostate should be invited to Islam and should never be condemned to death. The Maliki jurist Ibn al-Walid al-Baji (d. 494) and the Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyyah have held that apostasy is a sin which carries no hadd punishment and that a sin of this kind may be punished only under the discretionary punishment of ta’zir. The late Shaykh of al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltut, analysed the relevant evidence in the sources and drew the conclusion that apostasy carried no temporal punishment because in reference to apostasy the Qur’an only speaks of punishment in the hereafter. Shaltut also concurred with the analysis that the key factor in the Hadith which prescribed the death penalty for apostasy was “aggression and hostility against the believers and the prevention of a possible fitnah (sedition, civil strife) against the religion and state”. Mahmassani has also made a similar observation saying that “the death punishment was not meant to apply to a simple change of faith but to punish acts such as treason, joining forces with the enemy, and sedition”.
It is simply remarkable that the Hudud Bill which was drafted, we are told by a committee of prominent scholars of Shari’a, should ignore important issues on which the ulema have made impressive contributions of a kind that relate more meaningfully to the contemporary conditions of Malaysia and beyond. To turn a blind eye to their ijtihad and offer no alternative other than unquestioning imitation can hardly be recommended.
Definition of muhsan
This is yet another feature of the Bill where a reconsideration of the conventional fiqhi position was called for. The Bill defines muhsan as a person who is “validly married and has experienced sexual intercourse in such marriage”. A ghairu muhsan is on the other hand one who is not married or “is already married but has not experienced sexual intercourse in such marriage” (Clause 10).
It is difficult to understand that a person is a “muhsan” for the purposes of this Bill if he or she has at any time experienced sexual intercourse, there being no reference to the current state of the marriage at the time when the offence is committed. It thus matters little if a person, although once married, has separated or even divorced and had no access to his/her spouse for a long time. If the logic of imposing a severe punishment on a married person is that he or she can have lawful sexual relations with his or her spouse, then this logic can only hold if the culprit has committed zina during a valid and effective marriage. But if the reason behind this punishment (death by stoning), is that the person has experienced lawful sexual relations, even if only once, then it is difficult to understand the continuity of the state of ihsan in such a case. Muhammad Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida have held that the punishment of zina is only applicable to offenders who at the time of committing the offence were parties to a valid marriage. As for the offender who has been married once but is no longer so, he or she should be punished lightly or at most only the same as that of the unmarried offender.
The fuqaha have premised the distinction between muhsan and non-muhsan on the somewhat exacting rationale that once a person has experienced the bounty and joy of marriage he is bound to be eager to safeguard and protect the sanctity of that precious relationship. What about the other side of this argument: one who has experienced such a relationship but has seen it terminated or dissolved is likely to find it even harder to resist the temptation!
Abu Zahrah has concluded from his own enquiry into this issue that there is no clear text to determine that a woman who has been divorced or a man whose wife has died should be classified as muhsan. Abu Zahrah also refers to the views of Muhammad Abdub, and Rashid Rida and then concurs with them in saying that “a muhsan is a person who is protected, in the case of a woman, by her husband and when there is a separation, or divorce, she no longer qualifies as a muhsanah in the same way as she is no longer a mutazawwijah, or a married woman”.
The punishment of theft
The Bill penalises the first offence of theft with amputation of the right hand from the wrist. The second offence of theft is punishable with amputation of a part of the left foot “in the middle of the foot in such a way that the heel may still be usable for walking and standing” (Clauses 6 and 52).
The leading schools of fiqh have admittedly validated amputation of the left foot for the second offence. But this is disputable, and there is a minority opinion against it, for the simple reason that the Qur’an has not validated it. Two prominent Companions, Ibn ‘Abbas and ‘Ata, are reported to have held that no further amputation is valid for the second (and subsequent) theft, and supported this by citing the Qur’anic text, “And your Lord is never forgetful” (Maryam, 19:64). Ibn Hazm has strongly criticised the majority ruling here and said that it is quite remarkable that such drastic positions are taken (mainly by the Hanafis and Malikis) without there being any evidence in the sources to support them. El-Awa’s enquiry into this has also led him to the conclusion that the minority opinion here is “nearest to the spirit of Islamic law”. Our guideline on this issue should surely be the Hadith of the Prophet, discussed below, that if there is a choice between leniency and severity, we should, in the context of punishments especially, adopt the course which leads to leniency and not otherwise.
The Bill has completely ignored the possibility of tawbah or repentance and this issue is further discussed in the context of tawbah below. It has also not taken into account the arguments of al-Qaradawi, al-Ghazali, and al-Zarqa, about the punishment of theft in modern society. The drafters of this Bill seem to have merely translated D1-Mawardi’s, Al-Ahkam al-Sultanzyyah, with no effort at ijtihad nor consideration of the realities of modem life in Malaysia. I have also quoted below Abu Zahrah, Maududi, El-Awa, and Bassiouni, all of whom raise serious doubts as to whether justice would be served by the implementation of these penalties in contemporary Muslim societies.
Should drinking wine be a hadd?
The basic issue over shurb is that it does not belong in the category of hudud, and that the evidence for classifying it under the hudud is controversial. The Bill has, of course, identified shurb as a hudud offence which is punishable with “whipping of not more than eighty lashes but not less than forty lashes” (Clause 22).
Although shurb has been declared forbidden in the Qur’an, the latter has not specified any particular punishment for it. The evidence in the Sunnah also indicates that the Prophet has not treated shurb as a hadd offence. Drinking wine was a common habit among the Arabs which is why the Qur’an initially adopted a persuasive approach advising people of the ill-effects of drinking wine and subsequently discouraged it nearer the prayer time, and it was only in the third of the three separated ayat that it was declared totally forbidden. The Prophet s.a.w. also imposed different types of punishments for shurb, and reports indicate that offenders were in most cases subjected to beating.
Reports further confirm that when Abu Bakr was faced with the issue he asked the Companions but they did not know of any precise punishment for shurb. Notwithstanding this, and confirmation by a number of ulema, including Ibn Qayyim, al-jawziyyah, AI-Shawkani, and Ibn Farhun, the majority of jurists have not only classified shurb as a hadd offence but have claimed a general consensus (ijma’) on its punishment to have been fixed at 80 lashes which is evidently not the case. In their recent writings scholars, including Mustafa Shalabi, Fathi Bahnasi, Salim al-Awwa, and others, have stated that the alleged ijma’ on shurb being a hadd offence is incorrect and have held that it is a tazir offence. The basic argument for this being that hadd is by definition an offence for which a fixed punishment is prescribed in the Qur’an or Sunnah. When this is not the case, the whole concept of hadd collapses.
Issues over qadhf
Clause 12 of the Hudud Bill defines qadhf as making an accusation of zina against a Muslim of upright character which is not proven by four witnesses. The offence carries a fixed punishment of 80 lashes and also the offender’s “testimony shall no longer be accepted until he repents”.
The Bill istotally silent on the point as to whether the wishes of the victim of qadhf (maqduf) has any role in the enforcement of the prescribed punishment. According to the general agreement of the leading madhahib, the punishment of qadhf is not enforceable unless it is requested by the maqdhuf and if the latter forgives the offender, there will be no punishment. The Imams Shafi’i and Ibn Hanbal have held that qadhf consists of the violation of the right of Man and it resembles qisas both of which are amenable to pardoning by the victim. It is also a requirement on which almost all the schools are in agreement that the victim of qadhf needs to file a complaint against the offender and it is only then that judicial proceedings can take their course which might lead to the enforcement of the hadd of qadhf. But qadhf according to the Imams Abu Hanifah and Malik belongs to the Right-of-God category of offences, which means that no pardon may be granted by anyone after the matter has been brought to the attention of the court.
It would undoubtedly bear greater harmony with the letter and spirit of Shari`a on the subject of hudud to open up all the avenues whereby a hadd punishment could be mitigated or dropped. One such avenue would have been to make a provision whether or not the victim of qadhf wishes that the punishment should be carried out. Failure to do so, which is the case in the proposed Bill, marks a departure from the purport of the Hadith discussed below, which provides that making an error on the side of leniency is preferable to making an error on the side of severity.
AN ANALYSIS OF HADD IN THE QUR’AN AND FIQH
This part of the article.explores the validity or otherwise of the hypothesis that the juristic concept of hadd which the fuqaha have presented and developed tends to differ with what it means in the Qur’an. It is contended that some of the rigidities that are attendant in the juristic doctrine are not Qur’anic.
Hadd in the Qur’an
Hadd literally means boundary or limit which separates and prevents one thing from intruding on another. Fixed punishments are known as hudud because they are meant to prevent crime and signify the limits of what is tolerable and what is not. And then hadd is also used in reference to the crime itself, such as by saying that so and so committed a hadd. Hudud Allah is a familiae,”e4-x’pression which occurs 14 times in the Qur’an in the typical sense of signifying the “limits”, whether moral or legal, of acceptable behaviour from that which is unacceptable -in the sense for example of separating the halal and haram from one another. On no occasion has the Qur’an, however, used hadd or hudud in the specific sense of punishment, fixed-hr otherwise.
When we compare the Qur’anic usage of hadd with the use of this term in fiqh, we notice that a basic development has taken place, which is that the term hadd has been reserved to signify a fixed and unchangeable punishment that is laid down in the Qur’an or Sunnah. The concept of the “separating or preventing limit” of the Qur’an is thereby replaced by the idea of fixed punishment.
Hadd according to its fiqhi definition is “a quantitatively fixed punishment which is imposed for a violation of the Right of God”. Hadd is thus signified as a fixed punishment in contradistinction with ta’zir, which is neither fixed nor quantified. It is also a Right of God in contradistinction with qisas (just retaliation) which is a Right of Man. Hadd as a Right of God signifies a demand from God that requires fulfilment and no one therefore has the authority to pardon or suspend it.
Of the 14 instances where hudud are used in the Qur’an, no less than six occur in just one passage on the subject of divorce, which is as follows.
Divorce (may be given) twice. Thereafter, either retain (the wife) according to good custom (bi1-ma’ruf) or release her with kindness. And it is not lawful for you to take back anything you have given her unless the couple fear that they may transgress God’s limits (hudud Allah). If there is fear that they may transgress hudud Allah, they commit no sin if the wife willingly gives anything back. These are hudud Allah, do not transgress them. Those who transgress hudud Allah, they are unjust. But if he (the husband) divorces her, she will not be lawful to him thereafter until she marries another man. If he (the second husband) divorces her, there is no harm if the two return to each other, if they think they can observe hudud Allah. And these are the hudud Allah which He makes clear for a people who know (al-Baqarah, 2: 229-30).
The term hudud Allah carries slightly different meanings in its various applications above. While the idea of limits may be said to be common to all, in its uses 2, 3, and 6, it refers to the specific injunctions contained in the body of the text. Uses” 1, 4, and 5, do not refer to anything specifically stated, let alone enjoined, either here, or indeed elsewhere, in the Qur’an. In other words, when the Qur’an speaks of observing hudud Allah it states neither here nor elsewhere specifically what these “limits” are.
With reference to marital relations, the Qur’an demands a conduct which is in accord with good custom (bi1-ma’ruf). This is not to say that there are no other injunctions concerning marital relations in the Qur’an, but for the purposes of this text, hudud Allah is a general reference to the total conduct of marital life which is conveyed by the term bi1-ma’ruf. The content of good custom in this context is thus included in the general meaning of hudud Allah.
Two more points to note in this passage are: firstly that the term hudud has no reference to punishment, but is concerned mainly with a moral situation which may or may not have legal implications. Secondly, the content of “good custom” is evidently liable to change and does not fit in with the idea of a fixed and invariable provision. This must also imply that the content of hudud Allah is variable to that extent and that it is conceptually amenable to comprising changeable provisions.
In two other places (al-Baqarah, 2: 187 and al-Talaq 65: 1) the term hudud Allah is concerned with marital relations; the first with conjugal relations during the fasting month of Ramadan and the second with the waiting period (i.e. ‘iddah) that the wife must observe following a divorce. The text in both places warns against violating hudud Allah. Elsewhere the expression occurs in a passage where the textrecommends kindness to the orphans and the needy and specifies fixed shares in inheritance for legal heirs, and then declares that these are the hudud Allah that must be observed (al-Nisa, 4:12-13).
Hudud Allah also occurs in the Qur’an in reference to atonement (kaffarah) in conjunction with zihar. This is a form of divorce, originally a pre-Islamic practice, where the husband declares his wife to be unlawful to him ‘like the back of his mother”. The kaffarah that the husband needs to observe in the event of resuming marital relations consists of one of the following three: to release a slave, to fast for 60 consecutive days, or to feed 60 poor persons. The text then proceeds to declare that “these are God’s limits (hudud Allah) and for disbelievers is a painful torture (al-Mujadilah, 58:3-5). It is of interest to note here the use of hudud Allah in reference to a specific but self-imposed punishment which does not involve the enforcement authorities but only the individual himself. Moreover, by suggesting alternative atonements for zihar the Qur’an seems to admit the idea of alternative/ variable punishment for hudud Allah in line with the ability and condition of the persons who observe the kdffarah in question.
The “Divine Limits” (hudud Allah), according to Maududi, consist of certain principles, checks and balances, and specific injunctions in different spheres of life and they have been prescribed in order that man may be trained to lead a balanced and moderate life. They are intended to lay down the basic framework within which man is free to legislate, decide his own affairs and frame subsidiary laws and regulations for his conduct.
It is thus evident that the Qur’anic concepts of hudud and hudud Allah are not meant to consist of punishments, nor of purely punitive and mandatory sanctions. They are used in the Qur’an to imply a set of broad moral and legal guidelines which must be observed and upheld. The basic concern is clearly with the moral limits of conduct in the sense of identifying what is generally good and righteous as opposed to that which must be avoided and discouraged.
The Qur’an’s emphasis on repentance (tawbah)
In virtually all the four instances where the Qur’an specifies a punishment for an offence, there is also a provision for repentance, forgiveness and reformation. This is a consistent feature of the penal philosophy of the Qur’an which has, however, not been adequately reflected in the juristic doctrine of the fuqaha, nor indeed in the Hudud Bill of Kelantan. Notwithstanding the dual emphasis that the Qur’an lays on punishment and repentance, juristic doctrine pays undivided attention to the enforcement of punishment so much so that once the offender has been convicted of a hadd offence repentance is of no account and no one has the authority to pardon him. But we read a different message in the Qur’an. Thus the text (al-Ma’idah, 5:38-39) which penalises the thief with mutilation continues to provide, “But if the thief repents after his crime and amends his conduct, God redeems him. God is forgiving, most merciful”.
The reference to repentance in the text is immediately followed by the word ‘aslaha’ (reforms himself) and the two together would seem to require that the convict should not only be given time in which repentance and reformation can occur but also that this should be facilitated, on a selective basis at least, by positive incentives.
Abu Zahrah wrote in a commentary that the Qur’anic text on theft begins with ‘al-sariq wal-sariqah’ and these are adjectives, not verbs, and adjectives do not materialise in a person without a measure of repetition. A person is not, for ,example, described as “generous”, “honest”, or “liar”, merely by a single act of generosity, honesty, or lying. These adjectives carry their full meanings when there is recurrence and repetition. The ayah did not begin by saying, for example, that theft is punishable with such and such a punishment; if refers instead to sariq and sariqah. When we read the ayah from this perspective, then the punishment that it conveys should apply to recidivists but not to first time offenders. According to a report when the Caliph ‘Umar al-Khattab decided to mutilate the hand of a young offender, his mother said: “pardon him O Commander of the faithful, because it was his first time”. To this the Caliph responded, “Allah is too merciful to reveal the nakedness of His servant for his first failure”. Abu Zahrah has also discussed, in this connection, the issue of repentance where he observed that the wording of the text before us is such that repentance can only find a logical place in it, if it is given an opportunity before the imposition of punishment. This he adds is not the view of the majority but it is a view that is sustainable by the text and some ulema have in fact arrived at this conclusion.
The Qur’anic emphasis on tawbah can also be seen it its ayat on adultery and slanderous accusation (al-Nur, 24: 2-6) respectively: reference to punishment in each case is immediately followed by “unless they repent thereafter and mend their conduct” and “except for those who repent thereafter and reform themselves”. And then with-reference to highway robbery, we also note that the text expounds three types of punishments for this crime and then immediately provides: “Except for those who repent before they fall into your power. In that case know that God is forgiving, most merciful”.
It is thus evident that the Qur’an leaves the door of reformation and repentance open in all of the hudud offences without any exception or reservation. To deny this opportunity is clearly tantamount to overruling what is conveyed in the clear text.
Juristic views on repentance
The jurists have held three different views on repentance which may be summarised as follows:
(1) The first view maintains that repentance suspends the prescribed punishments, if it is offered prior to the completion of the offence and that the offence in question belongs to the right of God category hudud. Some jurists of the Shafi’i and Hanbali schools who subscribe to this view have done so by way of analogy to highway robbery (hirabah). It is thus argued that hirabah is the most serious of all crimes and if repentance in this crime is admissible, as is stipulated in the clear text, then the argument for its admissibility is even stronger in lesser crimes, namely of zina, shurb, and theft. The proponents of this view have also referred to a Hadith in which the Prophet has said: “One who repents for a sin is like one who has committed no sin”. It therefore follows that one who is not guilty of a sin is not liable to its punishment either. The Prophet has also said concerning the renowned case of Ma’iz b. Malik, when he was informed that Ma’iz ran away (while being stoned for zina): “Did you not leave him alone to repent so that Allah would have granted him a pardon-”. Among the proponents of this view some have further elaborated that repentance, in order to be admissible and convincing, should be accompanied by correction in conduct and this would require time (some suggest a period of six months, whereas others only say a long time) in which the sincerity of repentance can be ascertained and testified.
(2) The second view, which is held by the Imams Malik and Abu Hanifah as well as some Shafi’i and Hanbali jurists, has it that repentance has no bearing on the hudud, except in the case of highway robbery which is based on clear text. This view is premised on the argument that the wording of the Qur’anic ayah concerning the punishment of zina and theft are general (’am) which must apply to repenters, and non-repenters alike. The proponents of this view maintain somehow that the references’ to repentance in the Qur’anic ayat on theft and adultery are concerned with repentance after the imposition of punishment and not before. To this it is further added that when the Prophet ordered stoning in the cases of Wiz and al-Ghamidyyah, or when he adjudicated in certain cases of theft, on the basis of confession, the offenders in these cases had all shown signs of repentance as many of them had said that they wished to be purified of their sins but that the Prophet nevertheless enforced the hadd punishment on them.
(3) The third view, which is mainly attributed to Ibn Taimiyah and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-jawziyyah, has it that punishment purifies one from criminality and sin, and so does repentance. That punishment should be suspended when the perpetrator of a Right of God offence repents and in the meantime does not himself insist that only punishment can purify him of his guilt. But if he does so insist, then he or she may be punished even after repentance. Hence, when the perpetrator of a hadd offence repents prior to completing the crime, he or she will not be punished if the offence in question is a public right, or Right of God, offence, provided also that the offender does not demand to be punished.
When we look at the evidence in the Sunnah we find that the Prophet has on many occasions tried to persuade individuals who had confessed to a hadd offence to retract their confession and find a way out for them of their punitive predicament, presumably because confession is often indicative of repentance and the Prophet s.a.w has positively encouraged it. Notwithstanding this, only in the case of apostasy can it be said that repentance has found a place in the juristic doctrine, but only just so, because imposing a strict time limit of three days (cf. Clause 23[3] of the Hudud Bill) within which the offender must repent is really reducing the concept of repentance into a mechanical formality that is almost meaningless.
Juristic thinking over the hudud were caught, as from early times it seems, in a web of technicality, partly because of linking the hudud with the binary division of rights into Rights of God and Rights of Man in a manner that created more problems than otherwise. Juristic developments in this area have followed a course which seems to have made it difficult to integrate the Qur’anic outlook on repentance and reform to the underlying philosophy of hudud.
It seems that the Qur’an’s repeated emphasis on repentance has caught the attention of Ibn Hazm who wrote in a distinctly different tone of language to that of the majority of ulema. Thus, according to Ibn Hazm:
Since repentance is ordained by God and it is highly recommended, it is obligatory on all Muslims (kana fardan ‘ala kull muslim) to invoke it in accordance with the injunctions (alnusus) that were discussed. Hence inviting the offender to repent prior to the enforcement of hadd is an obligation and diligence in it is a duty If the Imam failed to invite the offender to repent prior to enforcement, an invitation to repentance should still be extended after the enforcement of hadd.
If we were to extend the juristic concept of hadd to the broad Qur’anic philosophy of reformation and repentance, we would have to depart from the notion of fixed and mandatory provisions of universal application. It would be possible perhaps to combine the Qur’anic directives on reformation and repentance with the notion of fixed penalties, or a range of quantified penalties. It would be difficult, however, to integrate into this approach the notion of both fixed and mandatory sentences that are totally closed to the attendant conditions and circumstances of individual offenders.
Hadd and haqq Allah in the juristic expositions of flqh
As already indicated the ulema have defined hadd as a fixed punishment imposed for violation of the Right of God. The Hudud Bill also describes hudud as “offences, the punishments of which are ordained by the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah”, and then it further specifies that the hudud punishments, “shall not be suspended, substituted for any other punishment, reduced or pardoned or otherwise varied or altered” (Clause 48). The other two categories of offences with which this Bill is exclusively concerned are qisas and ta’zir offences respectively.
By defining hadd as a fixed punishment (’uqubah muqaddrah) it is meant that the punishment is invariably specified and fixed, and not fixed, as it were, in the sense of fixing the minimum and maximum limits thereof. In ta’zir punishment the authorities are entitled to exercise discretion as to determining the type and quantity of punishment. Protecting the vital interest of the community may be said to be the basic objective of all punishment, including qisas, diyyah, and ta’zir, yet while this is generally acknowledged, it is suggested that compared to the hudud, offences in these other categories are not crucial for protecting the basic fabric of society, and that they relate more closely to the rights and interests of individuals than that of the community as a whole. ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Awdah merely expounded the conventional view when he wrote that theft, shurb, highway robbery, rebellion, zina. and apostasy pose a greater threat to society than the pain and grief that might be inflicted on victims. The victim of theft may lose his property but his grief is relatively less than the threat of terror and insecurity that is inflicted on his neighbours and fellow citizens. As for crimes such as “murder and injury, they affect individuals more than society and these are to some extent personal crimes in the sense that their perpetrators do not face everyone they meet with violence but confine their aggression to a particular individual”. The rationale we are faced with here does not really bear out and would in any case seem to have lost much of its relevance in conjunction with contemporary social realities, for it is hard to understand the assertion that killing and bodily injury represent a lesser threat to society than such other crimes as zina and qadhf.
When we look at the hudud as a separate category of punishment in contradistinction with qisas, we are reminded of the conditions that prevailed in the tribal society of Arabia at the time of the advent of Islam, in which the scope and manner of the application of qisas, where personal vendetta and tribalist urge for revenge needed to be checked and controlled. The emphasis was clearly on the objectivity of justice independent of tribalist and sectarian interests. The hudud would appear to have served this purpose in that they took the law in regard to a certain number of crimes out of the scope of tribal justice and the message was clearly conveyed that these are not open to negotiation, compromise and pardoning. But when we consider that the course of history has altered the picture and that changes have taken place as a result of such developments as urbanisation on a massive scale, communications, and modern methods of government etc. we find that the basic rationale of the early distinctions has been substantially eroded. While criminality remains a serious threat to the fabric of modern society and civilisation, there is no compelling argument to confine this only to a handful of specified or unspecified crimes. The changing conditions of society have never ceased to generate new problems, new opportunities for crime, and unprecedented varieties of criminal conduct which are often no less of a threat to the basic fabric of society and its values as the hudud crimes.
Basically all rights in Islam, as the Maliki jurist al Qarafi pointed out, consist primarily of the Right of God, which are in turn exercised and represented by the community of believers and their lawful government
August 1, 2008 at 2:44 pm
Salaams Redwan
Thank you for the info.
Barak Allah fik
August 1, 2008 at 3:35 pm
Assalamu Alaykum,
your welcome bro. i will always give you information about events.
Wassalam
Redwan Ahmed
August 1, 2008 at 6:21 pm
I shall send out a prayer for your friend Abdur Rahman and hope that they find ease and the means to cope. Brightest blessings.
August 4, 2008 at 10:53 am
Salaams Redwan,
Jazak Allah
August 4, 2008 at 10:53 am
Salaams Redwan,
Perhaps their might be a way of us combining this info?
August 4, 2008 at 10:54 am
Peace Mereth,
Thank you for your kind prayer. It really helps. God bless you always.
Abdur Rahman
August 4, 2008 at 10:56 am
Salaams Redwan
Jazak Allah for sending me the essay. It’s huge!! Perhaps, insha Allah, an easier method might be to send me a link.
Abdur Rahman